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1. Introduction 
 
Interest expenses are tax deductible, but dividends are not. This tax bias toward debt financing 
implies that firms generally have stronger incentive to use debt financing that might exceed the 
socially optimal level. This issue is exacerbated in a multijurisdictional setting where 
multinational corporations (MNCs) can take advantage of the differences in interest deduction 
rules and corporate tax rates across jurisdictions to minimize their tax bill (Desai, Foley, and 
Hines (2004), Minz and Weichenrieder (2010), Huzinga, Leaven and Nicodeme (2008), and 
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013)).  The action plan of OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
initiative (OECD 2013) has called to develop rules “to prevent base erosion through the use of 
interest expense” and to achieve this goal, various anti-tax avoidance measures have been 
adopted by countries. However, it remains unclear empirically how effective these measures 
are and how multinationals’ debt policy responds to limitations on interest deductibility. 
 
In this study, we use the UK worldwide debt cap rule (WDC) implemented in 2010 as a quasi-
natural experiment to study the effect of interest deduction limitation on debt allocation and 
organizational structures of multinational firms. The WDC requires multinational groups to 
conduct the gateway test and disallows interest deduction on UK net debt exceeding 75% of 
the multinational group’s worldwide gross debt. Employing a carefully matched group-
subsidiary dataset of multinationals with operations in the UK, we first examine the effects of 
WDC on the gateway test ratio of multinationals. We compare affected and unaffected 
multinationals in terms of their UK net debt and consolidated worldwide gross debt. We find 
that the ratio of UK net debt to worldwide debt of the affected companies declined significantly 
following the reform. This suggests that the worldwide debt cap is effective in curbing excess 
borrowing in the UK.  
 
We uncover an interesting heterogeneity underlying this baseline result. UK-headquartered and 
foreign-headquartered multinationals employ different strategies to reduce their gateway test 
ratio. Specifically, UK-headquartered multinationals reduce their UK net debt holdings (i.e. 
the numerator of the gateway test ratio) more than foreign-headquartered multinationals. In 
contrast, foreign-headquartered multinationals increase their worldwide debt holdings more 
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than UK-headquartered multinationals. This finding echoes concerns that the worldwide debt 
cap may encourage multinationals to raise more external debt.1   
  
Furthermore, we find strong evidence of debt shifting to non-UK subsidiaries by the affected 
MNCs following the WDC, relative to the unaffected MNCs. In particular, affected MNCs are 
more likely to shift debt to subsidiaries which are located in countries with a higher statutory 
tax rate. This result indicates that the UK worldwide debt cap has a strong spill-over effect on 
other countries. Combined with the finding that WDC has no impact on the overall effective 
tax rate of affected MNCs, our study shows that multinationals manage to shed the extra tax 
burden due to the worldwide debt cap by reallocating debt across subsidiaries. 
 
We also provide novel evidence on the effect of interest deduction limitations on organizational 
structures of MNCs, which has rarely been considered in previous studies. Our data allows us 
to track changes in organizational structures for each MNC over time. More specifically, we 
examine whether the percentage of subsidiaries located in high-tax-rate and low-tax-rate 
countries changed after an MNC failed the gateway test. We find that in addition to shifting 
debt from existing UK subsidiaries to non-UK subsidiaries, multinationals also adjust the 
location of affiliates to offset the negative impact of interest deduction limitation rules. 
 
Finally, we provide some evidence that the WDC may have had consequences for MNCs 
operations in the UK. We find that after the reform affected foreign-headquartered 
multinationals have reduced their activities in the UK by shrinking the size of the total assets 
held in their UK subsidiaries and by lowering their revenue. The affected UK-headquartered 
MNCs did not do so and as consequence their tax payments in the UK have increased 
significantly. 
 
Our findings provide strong evidence that multinationals utilize the allocation of debt across 
their subsidiaries for earning stripping and tax avoidance purposes. Previous empirical studies 
show that differences in corporate tax rates between the home and host countries significantly 
affect debt allocation of multinationals (Desai et al., 2004; Huizinga and Leaven, 2008). These 
                                                 
1 In April 1 2017 UK has introduced new rules on interest deductibility, where the worldwide debt 
denominator was replaced by EBITDA. This change likely reflects the concern that multinationals may 
be using worldwide gross debt manipulations to achieve the desired gateway test ratios. Our result shows 
that this concern was valid at least for some types of multinationals.  
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studies usually rely on cross-country differences in tax rates to identify debt allocation of 
MNCs. We adopt a different approach by studying MNCs’ debt shifting in response to a tax 
policy change that restricted debt deductibility. Hence, we provide more direct and casual 
evidence on the relation between MNCs’ debt allocation and tax motivations. As far as we 
know, this is the first study to provide direct evidence on debt shifting of multinationals in 
response to anti-tax avoidance rule, such as interest deduction restriction.  
 
In December 2017, the US passed the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act in which proposals were outlined 
to put limit on net interest expense deductions of multinational companies in the US.2 This 
proposed US reform adopts the worldwide approach similar to the WDC in the UK, which is 
different from existing regulations such as the thin capitalization rules. We are the first paper 
to examine the effectiveness of such “worldwide approach” as a new anti-tax avoidance 
measure. It is likely that more countries will adopt the worldwide approach to tackle MNCs’ 
tax avoidance in the near future. Our study highlights possible spillover effects when only a 
handful of countries adopt the worldwide approach.  
 
2. Policy background 
 
Many countries have attempted to curb the extent of debt shifting of multinationals by 
implementing anti-tax avoidance policies such as the thin-capitalization rules. Unlike the 
WDC, the thin-capitalization rules usually set up a fixed ratio, such as the debt-to-equity ratio, 
or the interest coverage ratio, and interest expense associated with debt exceeding the ratio are 
often disallowed for tax deduction. The thin capitalization rules are stand-alone rules in the 
sense that they consider each subsidiary of the multinational as a separate entity. Despite some 
evidence that thin capitalization rules reduce multinational companies’ incentives to use 
internal debt for tax planning purposes (Buetnner et al., 2012; Blouin et al., 2014), the 
limitation of the fixed ratio thin capitalization rule has also become apparent over the years. 
For example, the financing policies of multinationals are likely to be highly centralized and the 
thin capitalization rule can be easily circumvented. 3  More recently, the OECD has 
                                                 
2 The proposal put a limit on net interest expense deduction of the U.S. borrower at 110% of the U.S. 
borrower’s share of the group’s overall earnings. https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/files/updated-tax-
reform-12-7-17/3423467v9tcja-summary--nonus-debt-capital-markets-dec-7.pdf 
3 For example, multinationals can inject equity to subsidiaries with a high debt-equity ratio to avoid 
exceeding the fixed ratio. Webber (2010) provides the survey on the thin-capitalization and interest 
deductibility rules around the world.   
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recommended to use the “worldwide approach” to supplement thin capitalization rules.4 The 
worldwide approach evaluates the allocation of debt across multinational affiliates by 
comparing the amount of debt located in each country to the total amount of consolidated debt 
or EBITDA held by the multinationals. It has been advocated that the worldwide approach is a 
more effective method than the thin capitalization rules in addressing the earning stripping and 
debt shifting by multinational firms, as it is more difficult to circumvent (Desai and 
Dharmapala (2014) and Brunett (2015)).  
 
The UK has led the field by introducing the "worldwide debt cap" (WDC) reform as early as 
2010. In January 2010, the UK tax authority, the HMRC, introduced the "worldwide debt cap" 
to restrict the generous tax deductions for financing expenses enjoyed by multinational firms. 
HMRC's aim is that the UK should not bear interest expense that, in aggregate, exceeds the 
amount of interest actually borne by a worldwide group. As a measure to tackle the earning 
stripping and tax avoidance by multinationals, the worldwide debt cap was also motivated by 
the 2009 territorial tax system reform in the UK (Arena and Kutner, 2017; Egger et al., 2015). 
After the 2009 tax reform, the HMRC needed to compensate tax revenue losses as it no longer 
taxed dividends repatriated by multinationals under the new territorial tax regime.5 The UK 
WDC was applicable for periods beginning on or after January 1 2010 and up until April 1 
2017. To apply this rule, the net debt of all UK relevant subsidiaries of a multinational company 
is first added together, and a gateway test based on the ratio of total UK net debt to the 
multinational’s worldwide gross debt is calculated for each multinational group that has 
operations in the UK. The worldwide debt cap applies to company groups that have a corporate 
tax residence in the UK6, except those in the financial sector. A qualifying worldwide group is 
one that has more than 250 employees, above €50m turnover and/or above €43m balance sheet 
total assets. The rule is not optional and requires companies to calculate the so-called gateway 
ratio—the ratio of UK net debt relative to the group’s worldwide gross debt. If this ratio 
exceeds 75%, interest deduction is disallowed for the exceeding level of debt.  
 
When calculating the gateway test ratio, the numerator is defined as the average of the opening 
and closing net debt of each company that was a relevant group company (75% subsidiary) at 
                                                 
4 See, BEPS Action 4 report (2015). 
5 Miller (2017) estimates that the anti-tax avoidance measures, especially the restriction on relief for 
interest, have been the main way UK tax revenues have been raised since 2010. 
6 This means either a UK company or a UK permanent establishment of a non-UK company. 
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any time during the period. The opening and closing dates are the beginning and end of the 
accounting period for the company. The UK net debt is the difference between relevant 
liabilities and relevant assets. The type of borrowings that would be treated as relevant 
liabilities includes short term loans, overdrafts and long-term debt. Trade credit and liabilities 
in the form of share capital, such as preference shares, are not treated as relevant liabilities for 
the purposes of the gateway test, even if they are accounted for in financial liabilities. Relevant 
assets include cash and cash equivalents, lending, investment in government or company 
securities, and net investment in financial leases. Worldwide gross debt is measured by looking 
at amounts disclosed in the balance sheet of the worldwide group. It is based on the average of 
the consolidated liabilities of the worldwide group, calculated at the end of the current and 
preceding periods. Worldwide gross debt only considers external debt, while the UK net debt 
figure includes intra-group debt amounts.7 
Our study aims to identify the causal effect of the 2010 UK worldwide debt cap on MNCs’ 
debt allocation policies. It is worth noting that the UK experienced other tax policy changes 
during the same period of time. First, the UK moved from the worldwide tax system to the 
territorial tax system in 2009 and thereafter it exempts dividend repatriation by MNCs from 
being taxed in the UK. This reform has shown to lead to more dividend repatriation (Egger et 
al. (2015) ) and higher payouts to shareholders (Arena and Kutner (2017)). Second, the UK 
government gradually lowered the statutory corporate income tax rate from 28% in 2010 to 20% 
by 2015. The reduction in the statutory rate is a byproduct of the territorial tax system reform 
and it is a measure to increase UK’s competitiveness. Importantly, these two tax changes apply 
to all UK companies and are not specific to a certain group of MNCs. In contrast, the 2010 
worldwide debt cap targets large MNCs with exceeding debt holdings in the UK alone. There 
are also other smaller tax policy changes in the UK, such as the Annual Investment Allowances 
with the aim to stimulate business investment, and the corporate tax surcharge on banks. 
However, these other tax changes should have little impact on non-financial MNCs’ debt 
policies. 
3. Data and sample construction 
To examine the effects of the worldwide debt cap reform on debt reallocation of multinationals, 
we need to collect matched multinational group level (i.e. parent level) and their subsidiary 
                                                 
7  See the HMRC’s website https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/corporate-finance-
manual/cfm90160 for more detailed information. 
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level data. We use several databases to construct our sample.  First, we use Osiris by the Bureau 
van Dijk (BvD) to extract a sample of multinational firms. It is worth noting that the worldwide 
debt cape rule only applies to “worldwide groups” that own a relevant UK subsidiary. The rule 
defines a relevant subsidiary as 75% owned subsidiary and the net UK debt is calculated using 
only these relevant subsidiaries. Thus, we use the historical, 2010, version of Osiris to identify 
a sample of parent companies that own at least one UK subsidiary with 75% or more shares in 
2010, when the UK worldwide debt cap became effective. This procedure yields a sample of 
1,609 multinational groups. We then use the 2005-2014 CDs of ORBIS to extract subsidiaries 
affiliated with those parent companies with at least 50% controlling shares. Ownership 
structures of multinational groups change frequently, and our approach allows us to trace 
changes in organizational structures during the period 2005-2014.  
 
Next, we obtain consolidated financial data from Osiris for the parent company, which allows 
us to construct the multinational group’s consolidated gross debt. We obtain unconsolidated 
financial data for multinationals’ UK subsidiaries from FAME, which allows us to construct 
these subsidiaries’ UK net debt. Further, to analyze debt allocation between UK and non-UK 
subsidiaries, we use Orbis database to obtain financial data for the multinational groups’ non-
UK subsidiaries. In our benchmark sample, we obtain financial information for these 
multinational groups during the period 2008 – 2014.8 
 
We follow HMRC’s definition to calculate the UK net debt and worldwide gross debt using 
Osiris and FAME. We calculate the net UK debt and the worldwide gross debt for multinational 
groups in our sample by aggregating the total UK net debt of all relevant subsidiaries. Once 
we construct the annual UK net debt and worldwide gross debt for each multinational group, 
we use the HMRC guideline to construct the gateway test ratio for multinational i in year t, 
Gateway𝑖,𝑡 , as [𝑈𝐾 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝐾 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡] [𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡]⁄ . A 
multinational failed the gateway test, if its gateway ratio exceeded 75% in 2010. We find that 
197 multinational groups in our sample failed the gateway test. 148 of these failed 
multinationals are headquartered in the UK and the rest are headquartered elsewhere.  
 
                                                 
8 Note that the organizational structure information that we have ends in 2014 and that is when we cut our analysis 
sample as well. 
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To account for the differing characteristics of various multinational groups, we perform 
propensity score matching. We match companies using the one-to-one matching algorithm 
without replacement by industries, the location of the group parent and group size in 2010. 
After matching, we obtain 188 groups that failed the gateway test in 2010 and 188 groups that 
did not fail the gateway test.9 As a comparison, we also provide results using the full sample 
and alternative matching technique.   
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the matched sample before and after the 2010 UK 
debt cap reform. Here, we only include years 2008 and 2009 as pre reform years and years 
2011 and 2012 and post reform years. The median gateway test ratio for the multinational 
groups that failed the gateway test was 1.51 before the reform and 1.38 after the reform.10 This 
suggests that a median multinational firm that failed the gateway test did reduce its gateway 
ratio, although the post-2010 gateway ratio is still above the required level. The corresponding 
gateway test ratios were 0.03 and 0 for the firms that did not fail the gateway test in 2010. 
Multinationals that failed the gateway test had on average higher total net UK debt and lower 
worldwide debt than firms that did not fail the gateway test, both before and after the 2010 
reform. 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
We use the Difference-in-Differences methodology to investigate the responses of 
multinationals to the 2010 UK worldwide debt cap. Multinationals that failed the gateway test 
in 2010 are in our treated group, while those that passed the test are in the control group. We 
conduct three sets of experiments.  
 
4.1 Effect on gateway ratio, UK net debt and group gross debt 
 
We first estimate the effect of the cap on multinationals’ gateway ratio based on the following 
specification: 
 
                                                 
9 We do not find a match for every affected multinational in our sample. We have missing profitability and group 
size for some affected firms. Also, matching simply did not find comparable control companies.  
10 The number of firms that were above gateway test ratio was 136 in 2010, 137 in 2011, 144 in 2012, 143 in 
2013, 128 in 2014. Clearly firms reduced their gateway ratios but not below the required threshold. 
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𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = α1 + β1 × Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡 + 𝛾1Failed𝑖 + 𝛿1 × 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′
+ 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
 
where 𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the ratio of total UK net debt and the consolidated group gross debt 
(i.e. the gateway test ratio); Failed𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if multinational i failed 
the gateway test in 2010, and 0 otherwise; Post𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 from 2010 
onwards; 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′
 is a set of group-level control variables, including group size; 𝜗𝑡 is the time fixed 
effect, 𝜑𝑖 is the parent-specific fixed effect, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. The coefficient of interest 
is β1 , which captures the treatment effect of the worldwide cap rule on the multinational 
companies’ UK net debt ratio. If high levels of UK net debt observed among failed 
multinationals are mainly used to reduce UK taxable income, we should observe a decline in 
the gateway test ratio after the implementation of the worldwide debt cap. In this case, we 
expect the coefficient β1 to be negative. 
 
There are two ways to reduce the gateway test ratio either by reducing the numerator (net UK 
debt) or by increasing the denominator (worldwide gross debt). We therefore study the net UK 
debt and worldwide gross debt respectively in equations (2) and (3).  First, a MNC can reduce 
the gateway test ratio by reducing the level of UK net debt while keeping the worldwide gross 
debt unchanged. In this case, we expect the coefficient β2 to be negative. As reducing internal 
debt holdings in specific host countries is the goal of the “worldwide approach”, it is of policy 
importance to investigate whether the debt cap achieved this goal. More specifically, we 
estimate Equation (2): 
 
𝑈𝐾 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = α2 + β2 × Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡 + 𝛾2Failed𝑖 + 𝛿2 × 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′
+ 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (2) 
 
One criticism of the “worldwide approach” to tackle multinationals’ debt shifting behaviour is 
that it may lead to higher level of external borrowing. Indeed, the second way for the 
multinationals to pass the gateway test is to increase external borrowing while keeping the UK 
net debt unchanged.  To investigate this possibility, we replace 𝑈𝐾 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 with the group 
consolidated gross debt, 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡, and estimate Equation (3): 
 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = α3 + β3 × Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡 + 𝛾3Failed𝑖 + 𝛿3 × 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′
+ 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (3) 
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4.2 Effect on debt allocation within groups  
 
To fully understand the impact of the UK worldwide debt cap, we also need to investigate 
possible reallocation of debt between UK and non-UK subsidiaries for the multinationals that 
failed the gateway ratio test. It is possible that the multinational compensates the loss of interest 
deduction by shifting debt from its UK subsidiaries to non-UK ones, where no similar debt cap 
has been imposed.  Hence, we examine the financial leverage of non-UK subsidiaries of failed 
multinationals, relative to those of unaffected multinationals. Based on the subsidiary level 
data from Orbis, we estimate Equation (4):  
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑠,𝑡 = α + β × Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡 + 𝛾Failed𝑖 + 𝛿 × 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡
′
+ 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜑𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑠,𝑡   
(4) 
 
where 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑠,𝑡 is the net-of-cash leverage ratio of non-UK subsidiary j that belongs to 
multinational i, located in host country s, in year t. The net-of-cash leverage ratio is defined as 
the ratio of [Total debt-Cash] to [Total assets-Cash]. If β is positive, this indicates that failed 
multinationals will shift debt to non-UK subsidiaries after the implementation of the UK 
worldwide debt cap. Moreover, to understand whether debt shifting is tax sensitive, we interact 
Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡  with the statutory corporate income tax rate that the non-UK subsidiary i faces 
in year t in country s (CIT𝑖,𝑠,𝑡). In order to use interest expense to reduce the tax liability, a 
group is more likely to shift debt to high-tax countries. If the debt reallocation is driven by tax 
motives, we expect the interaction between CIT𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 and Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡  to be positive.  
 
4.3 Effect on organisational structure of multinational groups  
 
Another way that multinational group can adapt to reduce the effect of UK worldwide debt cap 
is to change the location of its subsidiaries. For example, it could sell the relevant subsidiaries 
in the UK to avoid the gateway test failure.  Hence, we investigate the effects of the UK 
worldwide debt cap on organizational structures of failed multinationals. The Osiris sample of 
firms includes all 1,609 multinational groups which had at least one relevant UK subsidiary in 
2010. Our data allows us to trace those subsidiaries ownership changes in the years 2005 – 
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2014. We calculate the time-varying number of subsidiaries located in high tax and low tax 
countries, as a ratio of the multinational’s total number of subsidiaries.11 We then estimate 
Equation (5):  
 
%𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗,𝑠,𝑡 = α + β × Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡 + 𝛾Failed𝑖 + 𝛿 × 𝑋𝑗𝑠𝑡
′
+ 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑠,𝑡  
  (5) 
 
where %𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑗,𝑠,𝑡  is the percentage of the number of subsidiaries belong to group j 
located in host country s in year t. In particular, we group countries s into high tax and low tax. 
Similar to debt reallocation, in order to use interest expense to reduce tax liability, a group may 
be more likely to increase the fraction of subsidiaries located in high tax countries following 
the reform at the expense of subsidiaries located in low tax rate countries. Hence, we expect 
the coefficient β to be positive for high tax countries and negative for low tax counties.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Graphical evidence 
In this section, we present graphical evidence on the effect of the UK worldwide debt cap. 
Figure 1a plots the average gateway test ratio together with confidence intervals for the treated 
and the control groups during the period 2008-2014. The treated firms are those failed the 
gateway test in 2010 and they are firms affected by the worldwide cap rule. The control group 
contains firms with the gateway test ratio below the threshold in 2010.  Figure 1a indicates that 
our treated firms reduced the ratio of UK net debt to worldwide gross debt from 2011 onwards. 
In contrast, firms in the control group experienced almost no change in their gateway test ratios 
after 2011. Note that for the multinationals that failed the gateway ratio test, the average 
gateway ratio is much larger than for those that did not fail the gateway test. Further, the 
average gateway ratio does not fall below the required 75% throughout the sample. The 
evidence from descriptive statistics in Table 1 indicates that the gateway test ratio does not fall 
below 75% for a median firm after the 2010 reform either.   
                                                 
11 Note that we do not analyze the absolute number of multinational subsidiaries. This is because there has been 
a change in the way that ORBIS records subsidiaries during our sample period.   
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Since the gateway ratio is defined as the UK net debt divided by worldwide gross debt, we plot 
the average of UK net debt and worldwide gross debt respectively in Figure 1b and 1c. First, 
note that the firms that failed the gateway test had on average higher UK net debt and lower 
worldwide debt than firms that did not fail the test. We find that treated firms have reduced 
their UK net debt gradually after the 2010 reform, while the control group firms did not change 
their UK net debt much. In contrast, the worldwide gross debt of both control and treated 
groups have moved together throughout the sample period, with worldwide gross debt of 
treated group growing slightly faster after the 2010 debt cap reform. Overall, Figure 1 provides 
preliminary evidence that UK’s worldwide debt cap rule has real impact on debt holdings of 
multinationals.   
In Figure 2, we distinguish between UK headquartered and non-UK headquartered 
multinational companies. In figures 2a and 2b present UK headquartered MNCs while figures 
2c and 2d report foreign MNCs.  Both UK and non-UK headquartered firms that failed gateway 
ratio test reduce the UK net debt while control groups do not change their UK net debt by much. 
However, UK and non-UK headquartered MNCs adjust their worldwide debt very differently. 
UK headquartered MNCs do not adjust their worldwide debt after 2010 and there is no 
significant difference between the treated and control groups in Figure 2b. In contrast, non-UK 
headquartered MNCs that failed gateway ratio test sharply increase their worldwide debt in 
year 2011 while those that did not fail gateway ratio test maintain relatively stable worldwide 
debt.  Overall, Figure 2 suggests UK-headquartered and non-UK headquartered multinationals 
respond to the worldwide debt cap in different ways. It seems that non-UK headquartered firms 
have more flexibility to adjust worldwide debt in response to the reform.   
5.2 Impact of the worldwide debt cap on group-level debt policies 
In Table 2, we report estimation results from Difference-in-differences analyses based on 
Equations 1-3. To increase the comparability between the treated and control groups, we use 
1-to-1 nearest neighbour matching technique to select the multinationals. In each specification 
we control for group size (the natural logarithm of group total assets). We also include a 
common set of year dummies to control for the business cycle effects. In the odd numbered 
columns we control for industry-specific fixed effects, while in the even numbered columns 
we control for group fixed effects. 
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In Columns 1 and 2, we report the estimation results based on Equation (1) where the dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the gateway ratio. Column 1 shows that before the reform, treated 
multinationals had a significantly higher level of gateway ratio with an estimated coefficient 
of 1.635. However, treated firms experienced a significant reduction in the gateway ratio after 
the implementation of the worldwide debt cap. The estimated treatment effect is -0.396 with 
statistical significance at the 1 percent level. Controlling for group fixed effects in column 2, 
we continue to find that after the reform, treated multinationals significantly reduced their 
gateway test ratio relative to multinationals in the control group. The economic magnitude of 
the effect is very large here. Since the dependant variable is in logarithms, we can interpret the 
estimated coefficients as percentage changes. We find that after the reform the multinationals 
that failed the gateway test have reduced the gateway ratio by 34% on average.  
 
In Columns 3 and 4, we use the natural logarithm of UK net debt as the dependent variable and 
report the estimation results based on Equation (2). First, treated multinationals had much 
higher UK net debt holdings than the control group before the reform. After the reform, treated 
multinationals significantly reduced their UK net debt holdings relative to the control group. 
We obtain similar result in Column 4 with group-specific fixed effects. Column 4 indicates that 
after the reform, the affected multinational groups lowered their holdings of net UK debt by 
138% relative to the control group. This reduction is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. 
 
In Columns 5 and 6, we report estimation results based on Equation (3) where the dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of group consolidated gross debt. It is important to note that 
the treated multinational groups have on average statistically significantly lower gross debt 
than the control group. This is consistent with the evidence from Figure 1c. The point estimates 
on the interaction term Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡  are both positive and statistically significant at 5 
percent level in Column 5 and at 1 percent level in Column 6. This result is consistent with the 
conjecture that the worldwide debt cap may encourage multinational firms to increase external 
borrowing. 
 
In the Appendix, we provide analogous results when we use the unmatched full sample (Table 
A1) and the matched sample using the alternative kernel matching technique (Table A2). 
Results are broadly similar based on the alternative samples. 
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Figure 2 suggests that UK-headquartered and non-UK headquartered multinationals respond 
to the UK worldwide debt cap in different ways. To formally test this, we split the sample into 
two sub-samples: UK headquartered MNCs and non-UK headquartered MNCs. We report the 
results in Table 3. Throughout Table 3, we control for group-specific fixed effects, a common 
set of year dummies and group size.  
 
Results from Table 3 confirm the heterogeneities revealed in Figure 2. While both UK 
headquartered and foreign-headquartered affected multinationals significantly reduced their 
gateway ratio relative to control group, this adjustment is achieved in slightly different ways. 
The affected UK headquartered  multinationals reduced their UK net debt by about 154% 
(column 3), with a small 25% increase to their worldwide gross debt (column 5). On the other 
hand, non-UK headquartered multinationals significantly reduced their UK net debt by about 
99% (column 4) but increased their worldwide gross debt by almost 54% (column 6).  
 
This heterogeneity is not entirely surprising for the following reason. The worldwide debt 
measure usually includes mainly external debt borrowing from third parties. Companies tend 
to borrow externally using the headquarter, rather than their affiliates. This is because there is 
some evidence that external borrowing is sensitive to tax incentives (Arena and Roper, 2010; 
Moen et al, 2018). This is because  headquarters usually have higher credit rating than affiliates 
and hence are able to get cheapest borrowing cost and most favourable terms. Consequently, 
the UK headquartered MNCs are relatively limited in reducing their gateway ratios—if such 
MNCs increase external borrowing in the UK, this will automatically increase their UK net 
debt. In contrast, a foreign headquartered MNC can complement the reduction of its UK net 
debt by substantially increasing external debt elsewhere.  
 
5.3 Debt reallocation across subsidiaries 
 
We have shown that multinationals that failed the gateway test in 2010 subsequently reduced 
their UK net debt holdings. In this section, we examine whether these changes are accompanied 
by debt reallocation across subsidiaries.  
 
First, since only subsidiaries owned at least 75% by the MNC are considered in the gateway 
test, multinationals that failed the gateway test could reallocate debt from at least 75% owned 
UK subsidiaries to other UK subsidiaries that are less than 75% owned. We find only very 
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weak evidence that MNCs shift debt from relevant subsidiaries with 75% or above control to 
UK subsidiaries with 50%-75% control (results not reported here). The leverage ratio among 
the 50%-75% owned UK subsidiaries has increased after the MNC failed the gateway test. 
However, the effect is not statistically significant. The reason for that may be twofold. First, 
the sample is small here, so it is possible that the coefficients are estimated imprecisely. Second, 
relocating debt to subsidiaries within the same country brings smaller tax advantage to those 
affected multinationals than moving debt to more tax advantageous location outside of the UK. 
 
Firms that failed the gateway test in 2010 could also reallocate debt from UK to other high tax 
countries to offset the loss of interest deduction in the UK. We expect the overall leverage ratio 
to increase among the non-UK subsidiaries of treated MNCs, if affected firms have reallocated 
their debt away from the UK. Further, we expect the increase in the leverage ratio to be more 
substantial in subsidiaries located in countries with higher corporate income tax rates. 
 
We test our hypotheses by estimating Equation (4) and the results are reported in Table 4. 
Throughout all columns in Table 4, we control for common business cycle effects and 
subsidiary-specific fixed effects. In columns 1-4, we use the full sample of MNCs. In column 
1, we estimate Equation (4) without adding any control variables. We find that multinationals 
which failed the gateway test have on average increased the leverage ratio of their non-UK 
subsidiaries by 0.2 after the reform relative to multinationals in the control group. Controlling 
for subsidiaries’ size and profitability, parent size (column 2) and host country year fixed 
effects (column 3), we continue to find a significant increase in the leverage ratio of non-UK 
subsidiaries of affected MNCs, relative to that of the control group. The magnitude of the effect 
falls to 0.147 increase in leverage ratio of non-UK subsidiaries when we include all the controls. 
These results show that the UK worldwide debt cap led to reallocation of debt from UK to non-
UK subsidiaries of affected MNCs. 
 
To test our second hypothesis that affected MNCs have stronger incentives to reallocate debt 
to subsidiaries facing a higher corporate income tax rate, we multiply Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡  by each 
host country’s statutory corporate income tax rate. 12  Result based on this specification is 
reported in column 4. The point estimate for Failedi × Postt × 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑠,𝑡  is positive and 
                                                 
12 We obtain each host country’s statutory corporate income tax rate from the Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation. 
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statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that leverage increased more in 
non-UK subsidiaries located in countries with a higher corporate income tax rate. The 
coefficient of 0.561 means that leverage increases by 11 percent in non-UK subsidiaries with 
20% tax rate and by 22 percent in non-UK subsidiaries with 40% tax rate. The results in column 
(4) suggest that affected MNC are more likely to reallocate their UK debt to countries with 
high tax rates. Hence, this debt reallocation may be motivated by tax planning.  
 
In columns 5 and 6, we repeat the estimations based on the specifications in columns 3-4 using 
the sub-sample of subsidiaries that belong to a UK-headquartered MNC. In columns 7 and 8, 
we analyse debt reallocation using the sub-sample of subsidiaries that belong to a non-UK-
headquartered MNC. We find that both types of multinational firms increased leverage in their 
non-UK subsidiaries following the reform relative to the control group (Columns 5 and 7), 
although the point estimate is only significant for non-UK headquartered MNCs. Similarly, for 
both types of MNCs, leverage increases when the host countries’ tax rate increases, but again 
this effect is only significant for non-UK headquartered MNCs (Columns 6 and 8). 
 
These results point towards an interesting pattern in debt reallocation for the two types of 
multinational firms. The UK-headquartered firms that failed the gateway test have reduced 
their net UK debt while making small changes to their worldwide gross debt holdings. At the 
same time, they did not significantly change leverage of their non-UK subsidiaries. This 
suggests that they may bear more burden of the imposed WDC. In contrast, non-UK-
headquartered multinationals increased their worldwide gross debt and significantly increased 
leverage in their non-UK subsidiaries. Thus, foreign headquartered MNCs are likely to have 
increased both internal and external borrowing outside of the UK.  
 
5.4  Impact of the worldwide debt cap on organizational structures 
 
Another way to offset the impact of the UK worldwide debt cap is to adjust the firm’s 
organisational structure. The gateway test requires calculation of the UK net debt ratio using 
relevant UK subsidiaries. Hence, an MNC can sell out shares of its UK subsidiary to avoid 
including the subsidiaries’ debt in the gateway test calculation. A more extreme solution would 
be to shut down its business in the UK and acquire new affiliates in other countries. These 
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organizational structure changes could be a costly but an effective method of offsetting the 
impact of the tax reform without changing the overall tax bill. 
 
Changes in organizational structure have rarely been discussed in previous studies, due to two 
reasons. First, organizational structure adjustment is more dramatic and more costly than 
simple debt reallocation across existing subsidiaries. Hence, it has been considered to be less 
likely to change in response to tax reform. Second, researchers need to obtain time-varying 
ownership structures of the multinational to conduct such analysis. Our unique data permits us 
to do this novel test. 
 
Specifically, for each group-year, we calculate the percentage of subsidiaries located in the UK 
relative to all controlled subsidiaries in the group. This ratio measures the relative importance 
of UK business in the group. Similarly, we also calculate the percentage of subsidiaries located 
in countries with higher and lower statutory tax rate than the UK. We then estimate the effect 
of the reform on the percentage of subsidiaries held in each of the groups of countries. We use 
percentages rather than numbers of subsidiaries because we are interested in the shifts in the 
importance of geographical locations for multinational business activities.  
 
Table 5 presents the results.13 In columns (1), (3) (5) and (7) we control for year fixed effects, 
while in columns (2) (4) (6) and (8) we further control for parent fixed effects. We find that 
that treated groups, compared to groups which are not affected by the gateway test, have 
relatively more UK subsidiaries (column 5) and fewer subsidiaries in other counties (columns 
1 and 3). We find support for the hypothesis that multinationals not only reallocate their debt 
holdings but are also likely to change the firm structure following the 2010 reform. Consistent 
with tax-motivated hypothesis, treated groups have increased the fraction of their subsidiaries 
located in higher tax regimes by 4.2 percentage points (column 1 and 2), and reduced the 
fraction of subsidiaries located in lower tax regimes by 3.7 percentage points (column 3 and 
4). These changes are statistically significant in 1 percent level. The increase in the fraction of 
subsidiaries held in higher tax regimes is not perfectly offset by the reduction in the fraction of 
subsidiaries held in lower tax regimes. Failed multinationals may also reduce the fraction of 
relevant (over 75% held) subsidiaries in the UK. We test this hypothesis in Columns 5-8, and 
                                                 
13 Note that we use all multinational groups with at least one relevant subsidiary in the UK in 2010 and trace them 
across the 10 years sample period here, 2005 – 2014. Using the much smaller (220 groups) matched sample yields 
negative but insignificant point estimates.  
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the results indicate that affected MNCs reduce the percentage of relevant UK subsidiaries in 
response to the UK worldwide debt cap although these results are not always statistically 
significant. 
 
Our results show that the affected MNCs increase the proportion of subsidiaries held in higher 
tax rate regimes following the UK worldwide debt cap. Thus, affected MNCs reallocate debt 
to other countries so that the negative impact of the UK tax reform would be minimized for the 
MNC as a whole. Our results show a possible spill-over effect if only one or very few countries 
adopts the worldwide approach—MNCs can shift debt to countries where no similar anti-tax 
avoidance policies are in place. Consequently, while the worldwide debt cap may help increase 
tax revenue for the HMRC, it may reduce tax payment by the affected MNCs in other countries. 
Therefore, the worldwide approach would be more effective in curbing the overall earning 
stripping by MNCs, if more countries adopt it. 
 
5.5  Impact on multinationals’ tax payments 
 
In this paper, we show that multinationals responded to the UK worldwide debt cap with debt 
reallocation and organizational adjustments. Did these adjustment help affected multinationals 
offset the extra tax burden due to the debt cap? To answer this question, we calculate the 
effective tax rate at the group level and compare affected MNCs to those unaffected by the 
reform. We report the result in Table 6. 
 
In Table 6, we do not find any significant change in group-level effective tax rates for the 
affected MNCs, relative to those in the control group. This result holds for both UK-
headquartered and non-UK-headquartered MNCs. The pattern is also robust to whether we use 
the matched sample or the full sample for the analysis. Taken together, our findings suggest 
that multinationals managed to fully offset the impact of the loss of interest deduction in the 
UK on their effective tax burden. In unreported exercises, we find no changes in affected 
multinationals’ investment behaviour following the introduction of the worldwide debt cap. 
 
In Table 7, we investigate whether the WDC had any impact on tax payments of multinational 
firms to the HMRC. Miller (2017) shows that the only recent tax policies in the UK that bring 
positive revenues to the HMRC are those that tackle tax avoidance practices of multinational 
companies, especially those policies that are related to interest deductibility restrictions. We 
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therefore investigate the effect of WDC on total tax payment of multinational firms to the UK 
authorities. In particular, we aggregate the tax payments across all UK subsidiaries of each 
multinational firm. 14  The results indicate that the reform has significantly increased tax 
payments of UK HQ multinationals only. Their tax payments have increased by 25%.15 In turn, 
there is some weak evidence that tax payments of non-UK HQ multinationals have decreased.  
 
In Tables 8 and 9, we explore whether this negative change in non-UK MNCs tax payments is 
related to the size of their operations in the UK. We find that non-UK headquartered MNCs 
significantly reduced the size of their total assets in the UK following the reform by about 31% 
and reduced their revenues by 23%. These results are consistent with the debt re-allocation 
results, which point to the fact that most of the adjustment is driven by foreign-headquartered 
MNCs which increased their leverage abroad significantly, while the UK-headquartered MNCs 
did not.  
 
Further, the organizational structure results are also mainly driven by foreign-headquartered 
MNCs which increased the fraction of subsidiaries they hold in high tax countries and reduced 
the fraction of their relevant UK subsidiaries (results not reported here). Together, these results 
suggest that foreign-headquartered MNCs reduced their presence in the UK as a result of the 
reform. This resulted in no increase in tax payments of foreign-headquartered MNCs in the 
UK. In contrast, since UK-headquartered MNCs have not adjusted their operations in the UK, 
they also bore the burden of the WDC in terms of increased tax payments. These results 
highlight the differential effect that the worldwide debt cap reform had on multinational firms 
depending on whether they were UK-headquartered MNCs or foreign-headquartered MNCs.  
 
5.6 Robustness checks  
 
Our baseline test on the UK debt is based on the data from FAME, while our test for non-UK 
subsidiaries is based on data from Orbis. FAME provides detailed internal and external debt 
for UK firms, which allows us to construct the gateway ratio test following exactly the method 
that the HMRC has applied to multinational firms. However, FAME only contains UK 
                                                 
14 Note that the results using UK ETRs are very similar. 
15 The UK corporate tax revenues as reported by the HMRC have increased from GBP 30.8 billion in 2009/10 to 
GBP 35.3 billion in 2010/2011 (excluding revenues from North Sea oil companies). The HMRC does not report 
the breakdown of corporate tax receipts by ownership type of companies. Evidence from Habu (2017) suggests 
that net tax payments of multinational firms has increased between the two tax years.  
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subsidiaries. That is why we have to rely on Orbis data to study the debt reallocation hypothesis. 
In order to ensure that our test on non-UK firms using Orbis and the study on UK firms using 
FAME are comparable, we redo the baseline analysis on the UK firms using Orbis data and net 
of cash leverage ratio measure. As before, we cannot observe whether the debt is internal or 
external in Orbis. Therefore, the measure of leverage using Orbis is noisy.  
 
We report these test in Table 10. Column 1 uses the whole sample of UK multinationals, 
column 2 considers UK headquartered multinationals only, while column 3 looks at non-UK 
headquartered multinational firms. Even with this noisy measure, we are able to confirm our 
conclusion from Tables 1 and 2. Treated groups significantly reduce the leverage of their UK 
subsidiaries by 0.059 (column 1) in response to the tax reform. This effect is only significant 
for the foreign-headquartered MNCs (column 3), but not for MNCs headquartered in the UK 
(column 2). Foreign-headquartered MNCs reduce both their relevant net UK debt and their UK 
leverage ratio following the reform. In contrast, UK-headquartered MNCs adjust their net UK 
debt but not their UK leverage ratio.  
 
We repeat our test on debt reallocation to non-UK affiliates, as reported in Table 4, by 
aggregating subsidiaries leverage to a multinational group - country level. We add up net of 
cash leverage and total assets of all subsidiaries belonging to the same multinational parent in 
a given host country and divide one over the other to obtain multinational group - country 
leverage ratios. We do not report those result here as the coefficients are not statistically 
significantly different from the ones obtained in Table 4. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper analyzes how multinationals adjust debt allocation in response to tax policy change 
that restricts interest deductibility. We use the UK worldwide debt cap reform in 2010 as a 
natural experiment to examine debt policy changes of affected multinationals. The reform 
restricted tax deductions available to the UK subsidiaries of multinational companies to be 
within a certain threshold of the multinational group’s worldwide debt holdings.  Unlike the 
widely adopted thin capitalization rule, the worldwide approach should be more difficult to 
circumvent and thus, should have a more substantial effect on earning stripping by 
multinationals. We collect matched subsidiary and group-level financial and ownership 
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structure information and conduct a difference-in-differences analysis. We provide causal 
evidence for a negative and substantial effect of the UK worldwide debt cap on the ratio of UK 
net debt to the multinational worldwide debt holdings. We show that multinational companies 
reduced their net UK debt in response to the debt cap, and the reform led to increasing external 
borrowing only among multinationals headquartered in foreign countries.  
 
We show that the UK worldwide debt cap may have generated some spillover effect on other 
countries that did not adopt the same anti-tax avoidance approach. Specifically, multinational 
firms reallocate debt from their UK subsidiaries to non-UK subsidiaries, especially those in 
high tax countries. We also find that the affected multinationals substitute their low tax 
subsidiaries with high tax subsidiaries to be able to use the high tax jurisdictions as debt hubs. 
This replaces UK as a previous debt hub. These two put together suggest that the worldwide 
debt cap approach, without collaboration between countries, can lead to debt reallocation and 
does not effectively curb multinationals’ earning stripping. 
22 
 
References 
Arena, M. P., and Kutner, G. W. (2015). “Territorial tax system reform and corporate financial 
policies,” Review of Financial Studies 28(8): 2250-2280. 
Blouin, J., Huizinga, H., Laveven, L., and Nicodeme, G. (2014). “Thin Capitalization Rules 
and Multinational Firm Capital Structure,” IMF working paper 14/12. 
Buetnner, T., Overesch, M., Schreibe, U., and Wamser, G. (2012). “The impact of thin-
capitalization rules on the capital structure of multinational firms”, Journal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 96: 930-938. 
Davies, R. B., Martin, J., Parenti, M., & Toubal, F. (2018). Knocking on Tax Haven's Door: 
Multinational Firms and Transfer Pricing. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
forthcoming . doi:10.1162/REST_a_00673 
Desai, M. A., Foley, C. F., & Hines. (2004). A multinational perspective on capital structure 
choice and internal capital markets. The Journal of Finance, 59(6), 2451-2487. 
Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala, (2015). Interest deduction in a multijurisdictional world. 
Coase-Sandor Institue for law and economics working paper no. 725.     
Dharmapala, D. and N. Riedel (2013). Earnings Shocks and Tax-Motivated Income Shifting: 
Evidence from European Multinationals. Journal of Public Economics 97, 95-107. 
Dharmapala, D. (2014). What Do We Know about Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review 
of the Empirical Literature. Fiscal Studies, 35(4), 421–448. 
Egger, P., Merlo, V., Ruf, M., and Wamser, G. (2015). “Consequences of the new UK tax 
exemption system: evidence from micro-level data,” The Economic Journal 125: 1764-1789. 
Habu, K. (2017). How much tax do companies pay in the UK? Evidence from UK confidential 
corporate tax returns. CBT Working Paper 17/14 
Hanlon, M., & Heitzman. (2010). A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 50(2), 127-178. 
23 
 
Huizinga, H., & Laeven, L. (2008). International profit shifting within multinationals: A multi-
country perspective. Journal of Public Economics, 92(5), 1164–1. 
Miller, H. (2017). “What’s been happening to corporation tax?”  Institute of Fiscal Studies, 
briefing note. Available at https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/9207. 
Mintz, J. M. and A. Weichenrieder (2010) The Indirect Side of Direct Investment: 
Multinational Company Finance and Taxation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en 
Sullivan & Cromwell (2009). UK worldwide debt cap. SC publication, Sullivan and Cromwell 
LLP.  
Webber, S., (2010). Thin capitalization and interest deduction rules:  A worldwide survey.  Tax 
notes international 60 (9) 683-708.
24 
 
Figure 1. Time-series evolution of the gateway test ratio, net UK debt. and worldwide 
gross debt of the treated and the control groups. 
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    Figure 2. Time-series evolution of the gateway test ratio, net UK debt and worldwide 
gross debt– UK headquartered and non-UK headquartered MNCs. 
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Table 1: Impact of the worldwide debt cap on group-level debt holdings 
Treated group 
  
gateway test debt ratio total UK Debt worldwide debt log GU0 assets GUO profitability 
before 2010 mean  3.53 -4.50 365,976 698,718 13.42 0.07 
 
median 1.51 -0.28 55,001 29,873 13.21 0.07 
 
sd  4.54 13.51 660,519 3,791,304 1.65 0.12 
after 2010 mean  3.51 -3.15 358,037 686,071 13.27 0.04 
 
median 1.38 0.13 58,877 46,832 13.08 0.06 
 
sd  4.86 11.98 645,878 3,758,954 1.64 0.15 
Control group 
before 2010 mean  0.56 -4.31 99,414 1,145,676 13.49 0.06 
 
median 0.03 -0.69 5,787 74,147 13.27 0.07 
 
sd  2.14 10.86 359,316 4,069,773 1.75 0.11 
after 2010 mean  0.15 -3.87 89,273 1,045,441 13.39 0.05 
 
median 0.00 -0.53 3,691 110,170 13.17 0.06 
 
sd  0.28 10.36 330,597 3,254,207 1.71 0.12 
Note:  This table reports the summary statistics of selected variables before and after the implementation of UK WDC rule, decomposed into 
treated and control groups.  Treated group includes firms that failed the gateway ratio test in 2010. Control group contains firms that didn’t fail the 
gateway ratio in 2010 and propensity score matched on industry, GUO location, GUO size and, matching one-to-one without replacement.  Before 
2010 include data in 2008 and 2009, and after 2010 refers to data in 2011 and 2012.    
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Table 2: Impact of the worldwide debt cap on group-level debt holdings 
 Gateway ratio UK net debt Gross debt 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Failed𝑖 1.635***  6.313***  -0.455***  
 (0.093)  (0.258)  (0.118)  
Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡 -0.396*** -0.341*** -1.612*** -1.384*** 0.269** 0.318*** 
 (0.108) (0.079) (0.296) (0.198) (0.136) (0.084) 
Group size -0.300*** -0.542*** 0.949*** 0.258 1.056*** 0.980*** 
 (0.019) (0.075) (0.049) (0.185) (0.023) (0.087) 
Industry FE YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
No. of groups 376 376 376 376 376 376 
Observations 2,054 2,054 2,054 2,054 2,054 2,054 
 
Note: Baseline results using the 75% ownership criteria, excluding financial services 
companies. Propensity score matching on industry, GUO location and GUO size in 
2010, matching one-to-one without replacement. Gross debt is worldwide gross debt of 
a whole multinational group, UK debt is net UK debt holdings for all UK subsidiaries, 
and gateway is the ratio of net UK debt to worldwide gross debt. Here ownership 
structure varies across years. Standard errors are clustered at parent and year level. 
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Table 3: Impact of the worldwide debt cap on group-level debt holdings--headquarter heterogeneities 
 
 Gateway ratio UK net debt Gross debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES UK Non-UK UK Non-UK UK Non-UK 
       
Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡 -0.279*** -0.539*** -1.537*** -0.990*** 0.248*** 0.538*** 
 (0.085) (0.187) (0.233) (0.378) (0.093) (0.192) 
Group size -0.459*** -1.156*** 0.249 -0.033 0.890*** 1.616*** 
 (0.079) (0.162) (0.211) (0.333) (0.091) (0.229) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of groups 278 98 278 98 278 98 
Observations 1,531 523 1,531 523 1,531 523 
 
Note: UK vs foreign owned multinationals with parent as a unit of observation; using the 75% ownership criteria; excluding financial services 
companies. Propensity score matching on industry, GUO location, and GUO size in 2010, matching one to one without replacement. Gross debt 
is worldwide gross debt of a whole multinational group, UK debt is net UK debt holdings for all UK subsidiaries, and gateway is the ratio of net 
UK debt to worldwide gross debt. Standard errors are clustered at parent and year level. 
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Table 4: Impact of the worldwide debt cap on non-UK subsidiaries’ leverage ratio 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES lev3 lev3 lev3 lev3 UK HQ UK HQ non-UK HQ non-UK HQ 
         
 0.186*** 0.156*** 0.138***  0.073**  0.216***  
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)  (0.035)  (0.065)  
    0.543***  0.253**  0.908*** 
    (0.104)  (0.119)  (0.210) 
Subsidiary profitability  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.129 -0.137* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.083) (0.078) 
Subsidiary size  0.161*** 0.166*** 0.162*** 0.166*** 0.164*** 0.180*** 0.177*** 
  (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.043) (0.044) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Host country-year FE NO NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Subsidiary FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 11,827 11,198 11,198 11,193 6,693 6,691 4,505 4,502 
R-squared 0.008 0.027 0.084 0.027 0.109 0.029 0.139 0.036 
Matching YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Note: Dependent variable is net-of-cash leverage ratio. All multination and UK vs foreign owned multinationals with parent as a unit of 
observation; using the 75% ownership criteria; excluding financial services companies. Propensity score matching on industry, GUO location, 
GUO size in 2010, matching one to one without replacement. Standard errors are clustered at subsidiary and year level.
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Table 5: Impact of the worldwide debt cap on organizational structure 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES higher higher lower lower UK UK UK 75+ UK 75+ 
         
Failed𝑖 -0.226***  -0.063***  0.368***  0.357***  
 (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡 0.043*** 0.042*** -0.028*** -0.037*** -0.016 -0.002 -0.028 -0.016* 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.019) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) 
Observations 11,983 11,983 11,983 11,983 11,983 11,983 11,983 11,983 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Parent FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
 
Note: Dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is proportion of subsidiaries in countries with statutory tax rate higher than UK relative to total 
subsidiaries in the group. Dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is proportion of subsidiaries in countries with statutory tax rate lower than UK. 
In columns (5) and (6), dependent variable is the proportion of UK subsidiaries with control share above 50%.  In columns (5) and (6), dependent 
variable is the proportion of UK subsidiaries with control share above 75%. Standard errors are clustered at parent and year level. 
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Table 6: Impact of the worldwide debt cap on consolidated level effective tax rates 
 All MNCs  UK-headquartered MMNCs  Non-UK-headquartered 
MNCs 
  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡 -0.005 -0.008 0.021 -0.022 -0.072 -0.051 
 (0.025) (0.018) (0.031) (0.024) (0.045) (0.035) 
Group size -0.038 -0.017 -0.001 -0.015 -0.106*** -0.015 
 (0.027) (0.017) (0.035) (0.024) (0.040) (0.022) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Parent FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No of groups 241 1,162 171 319 70 843 
Observations 1,271 6,167 907 1,717 364 4,450 
Matched sample YES NO YES NO YES NO 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the ratio of tax payments to profit and loss before tax calculated 
at the parent level. Columns 1 and 2 consider all MNCs, columns 3 and 4 UK headquartered 
MNCs only, and columns 5 and 6 non-UK headquartered MNCs only. Parent is a unit of 
observation: excluding financial services companies. Propensity score matching on industry, 
GUO location and GUO size in 2010, matching one to one without replacement. Standard 
errors are clustered at parent and year level. 
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Table 7: Impact of the worldwide debt cap on UK subsidiaries tax payments. 
 
 All MNCs  UK-headquartered MMNCs  Non-UK-headquartered 
MNCs 
  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
 0.119 -0.019 0.257** 0.152* -0.225 -0.050 
 (0.093) (0.071) (0.103) (0.089) (0.203) (0.158) 
Group size 0.453*** 0.245*** 0.521*** 0.522*** 0.249 0.116 
 (0.115) (0.065) (0.122) (0.105) (0.325) (0.074) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Parent FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No of groups 317 1,761 237 473 80 1,288 
Observations 1,338 7,324 1,010 1,925 328 5,399 
Matched 
sample 
YES NO YES NO YES NO 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the logarithm of total tax payments calculated for all UK 
subsidiaries of each multinational group. Columns 1 and 2 consider all MNCs, columns 3 and 
4 UK headquartered MNCs only, and columns 5 and 6 non-UK headquartered MNCs only. 
Parent is a unit of observation; using the 75% ownership criteria to include subsidiaries; 
excluding financial services companies and excluding UO, UO- and JO ownership categories. 
Propensity score matching on industry, GUO location and GUO size in 2010, matching one to 
one without replacement. Standard errors are clustered at parent and year level. 
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Table 8: Impact of the worldwide debt cap on UK subsidiaries size of total assets. 
 All MNCs  UK-headquartered MMNCs  Non-UK-headquartered 
MNCs 
  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡 -0.075** -0.122*** -0.006 -0.002 -0.344*** -0.306*** 
 (0.037) (0.027) (0.033) (0.028) (0.113) (0.080) 
Group size 0.409*** 0.398*** 0.299*** 0.337*** 0.977*** 0.450*** 
 (0.049) (0.033) (0.041) (0.041) (0.150) (0.050) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Parent FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No of groups 376 2,078 278 580 98 1,498 
Observations 2,054 10,807 1,531 2,944 523 7,863 
Matched sample YES NO YES NO YES NO 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the logarithm of total asset size calculated for all UK subsidiaries 
of each multinational group. Columns 1 and 2 consider all MNCs, columns 3 and 4 UK 
headquartered MNCs only, and columns 5 and 6 non-UK headquartered MNCs only. Parent is 
a unit of observation; using the 75% ownership criteria to include subsidiaries; excluding 
financial services companies. Propensity score matching on industry, GUO location and GUO 
size in 2010, matching one to one without replacement. Standard errors are clustered at parent 
and year level. 
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Table 9: Impact of the worldwide debt cap on UK subsidiaries revenues. 
 All MNCs  UK-headquartered MMNCs  Non-UK-headquartered 
MNCs 
  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Failed𝑖
× Post𝑡 
-0.044 -0.007 0.041 0.097** -0.348*** -0.225*** 
 (0.040) (0.033) (0.044) (0.040) (0.096) (0.069) 
Group size 0.261*** 0.259*** 0.216*** 0.260*** 0.546*** 0.264*** 
 (0.042) (0.028) (0.042) (0.038) (0.118) (0.040) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Parent FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No of groups 365 2,005 270 552 95 1,453 
Observations 1,983 10,420 1,484 2,806 499 7,614 
Matched 
sample 
YES NO YES NO YES NO 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the logarithm of turnover calculated for all UK subsidiaries of 
each multinational group. Columns 1 and 2 consider all MNCs, columns 3 and 4 UK 
headquartered MNCs only, and columns 5 and 6 non-UK headquartered MNCs only. Parent is 
a unit of observation; using the 75% ownership criteria to include subsidiaries; excluding 
financial services companies. Propensity score matching on industry, GUO location and GUO 
size in 2010, matching one to one without replacement. Standard errors are clustered at parent 
and year level. 
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Table 10: Cross check of the impact of worldwide debt cap on UK debt using Orbis data   
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
All MNCs 
UK-headquartered 
MNCs 
foreign-headquartered 
MNCs 
    
 -0.059*** -0.041** -0.301*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.085) 
Subsidiary profitability -0.134*** -0.124*** -0.371** 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.164) 
Subsidiary size 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.076* 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.043) 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Sub FE YES YES YES 
Host country-year FE NO NO NO 
Observations 8,029 6,801 1,228 
R-squared 0.017 0.016 0.065 
matching YES YES YES 
 
Note: Dependent variable is net-of-cash leverage ratio. Column 1 use all subsidiaries located 
in UK. Column 2 uses the subsidiaries controlled by parent group with more than 75% shares. 
Columns 3 and 4 examines subsidiaries affiliated to parent group, which is headquartered in 
UK. Columns 5 and 6 examines subsidiaries affiliated to parent group, which is headquartered 
outside of UK. Standard errors are clustered at subsidiary and year level. 
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Appendix A: Benchmark results based on alternative samples 
 
Table A1: Impact of the worldwide debt cap on group level debt based on the full sample. 
 ¤ Gateway ratio UK net debt Gross debt 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Failed𝑖 1.589***  6.974***  -0.711***  
 (0.082)  (0.157)  (0.100)  
Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡 -0.215** -0.112* -0.991*** -0.927*** 0.100 0.031 
 (0.097) (0.062) (0.198) (0.132) (0.118) (0.066) 
Group size -0.471*** -0.580*** 0.878*** 0.323*** 1.119*** 1.089*** 
 (0.009) (0.054) (0.022) (0.111) (0.008) (0.070) 
Industry FE YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
No. groups 1,609  1,609 1,609 1,609 1,609 1,609 
Observations 9,631 9,631 9,631 9,631 9,631 9,631 
 
Note: Baseline results using the 75% ownership criteria, excluding financial services 
companies. Gross debt is worldwide gross debt of a whole multinational group, UK debt is net 
UK debt holdings for all UK subsidiaries, and gateway is the ratio of net UK debt to worldwide 
gross debt. Here ownership structure varies across years. Standard errors are clustered at parent 
and year level. 
 
 
Table A2: Impact of the worldwide debt cap on group level debt based on the kernel-
matched sample. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Gateway ratio UK net debt Gross debt 
    
Failed𝑖 × Post𝑡 -0.381*** -1.303*** 0.268*** 
 (0.068) (0.170) (0.074) 
Group size -0.578*** 0.220 1.047*** 
 (0.067) (0.162) (0.083) 
Industry FE NO NO NO 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Group FE YES YES YES 
No. of groups 1,373 1,373 1,373 
Observations 7,785 7,785 7,785 
Note: Baseline results using the 75% ownership criteria, excluding financial services 
companies. Propensity score matching on industry, GUO location and GUO size in 2010, 
matching using kernel. Gross debt is worldwide gross debt of a whole multinational group, UK 
debt is net UK debt holdings for all UK subsidiaries, and gateway is the ratio of net UK debt 
to worldwide gross debt. Here ownership structure varies across years. Standard errors are 
clustered at parent and year level. 
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